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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In 1998, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down its de-
cision in Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp.,1 which joined a group of Su-
preme Court2 and lower federal court3 cases which have, one by one, 
twisted and turned the Supreme Court’s holding in Illinois Brick Co. 
v. Illinois4 into an incomprehensible mess. The Eighth Circuit in 
Campos continued to muddy the waters of antitrust standing by re-
formulating5 Illinois Brick’s “indirect purchaser doctrine”6 to effec-
tively create an insurmountable barrier to those plaintiffs injured by 
Ticketmaster’s antitrust violations who wish to find their redress 
through compensation under section 4 of the Clayton Act.7 These 
cases have helped not only to deny certain injured plaintiffs standing 
to sue but also to confuse the lower courts about how to apply this 
indirect purchaser analysis. It is also difficult for potential defen-
dants to determine whether their actions violate Illinois Brick. 
 Part II of this Comment provides an in-depth overview of the 
Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Campos and the underlying factual back-
ground that accompanies that decision. Part III discusses the legal 
basis for the indirect purchaser doctrine in Illinois Brick and its 
“mirror image”8 predecessor, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp.9 In Part IV, this Comment demonstrates the confusion 
surrounding the Illinois Brick decision by analyzing how, in subse-
quent opinions, the Supreme Court has grappled with its own indi-
rect purchaser analysis and how the lower courts’ incredible at-
tempts to synthesize these mixed signals from the High Court have 
created a great amount of inconsistency. Lastly, this Comment posits 
                                                                                                                    
 1. 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1102 (1999). 
 2. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989); Assoc. Gen. Contractors of 
Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983); Blue Shield of Va. v. 
McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982). 
 3. See Lucas Auto. Eng’g, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 140 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 
1998); Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 131 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 
1997); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997); 
McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Lower Lake Erie Iron 
Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 4. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).  
 5. See Campos, 140 F.3d at 1169-70 (holding that indirect purchasers who bear some 
of the portion of the monopoly overcharge “only by virtue of an antecedent transaction be-
tween the monopolist and another, independent purchaser . . . may not sue to recover 
damages for the portion of the overcharge they bear”). 
 6. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 729 (holding that only the overcharged direct pur-
chaser, not any other purchaser farther down the manufacture or distribution chain, may 
have standing to pursue an action seeking treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton 
Act). 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000). 
 8. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Stand-
ing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule Under Illinois 
Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602, 603 (1979). 
 9. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
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in Part V that we can better view Campos and other cases of this na-
ture through a different lens—a more pragmatic approach to the 
common law antitrust standing doctrine announced by the Supreme 
Court in Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. Cali-
fornia State Council of Carpenters (AGC).10 
II.   LOOKING AT CAMPOS V. TICKETMASTER CORP. 
 The path to the Eighth Circuit began in December 1994, when six-
teen suits against Ticketmaster Corporation, the largest entertain-
ment ticket distributor in the United States,11 were consolidated in 
the Eastern District of Missouri for pretrial proceedings.12 Each suit 
involved plaintiffs—individuals and groups of individuals who had 
purchased tickets through Ticketmaster—naming various members 
of Ticketmaster’s management structure and the corporation itself as 
defendants.13 In September 1995, after dismissal of eleven of these 
cases, the remaining five plaintiffs filed a new consolidated com-
plaint solely against Ticketmaster Corporation.14 
 In their consolidated complaint, these plaintiffs alleged five counts 
of antitrust violation. Two counts alleged that Ticketmaster violated 
section 1 of the Sherman Act15 by entering into exclusive agreements 
with various concert venues and promoters to fix ticket prices16 and 
“conspiring with [such] venues and promoters to boycott performers 
who refused to allow the venue to use Ticketmaster’s distribution 
services.”17 Because performers such as Pearl Jam18 refused to con-
tract to play at venues conspiring with Ticketmaster, the plaintiffs 
were allegedly injured by being prohibited from enjoying these boy-
cotted performers.19  Two counts alleged violations of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act20 for Ticketmaster’s elimination or attempt to eliminate 
competition in the market for ticket distribution services.21 Lastly, 
                                                                                                                    
 10. 459 U.S. 519 (1983). 
 11. Brett Atwood, Web Ticket Sales to Pass $2 Bil. by 2001, BILLBOARD, May 31, 1997, 
at 81 (stating that Ticketmaster “maintains its stranglehold on the [ticket] distribution 
system”). 
 12. In re Ticketmaster Corp. Antitrust Litig., 929 F. Supp. 1272, 1275 (E.D. Mo. 
1996), rev’d sub nom. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 16.  In re Ticketmaster, 929 F. Supp. at 1276.  
 17. Jill S. Kingsbury, Note, The Indirect Purchaser Doctrine: Antecedent Transaction?, 
65 MO. L. REV. 473, 474 (2000). 
 18. See Lessley Anderson, Tickets! Please, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Oct. 4, 1999 (explain-
ing that Pearl Jam was forced to play smaller clubs, and make less revenue, in order to 
make financial-friendly ticket distribution services available to their fans and avoid the ex-
cessive service charges levied by Ticketmaster).  
 19.  In re Ticketmaster, 929 F. Supp at 1276.  
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 2.  
 21. In re Ticketmaster, 929 F. Supp at 1276; Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 474. 
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one count alleged that Ticketmaster violated section 7 of the Clayton 
Act22 through its illegal acquisition of its competitors, which has ef-
fectively inhibited entry into the ticket distribution industry.23 
 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief from Ticketmaster’s alleged 
violations under section 16 of the Clayton Act24 and treble damages 
under section 4 of the Clayton Act.25 The plaintiffs premised these 
damages on alleged overcharges in the form of excessive service fees 
arising from Ticketmaster’s exercise of monopoly power in the ticket 
distribution market.26  
 The lower tribunal dismissed the action, holding that the plain-
tiffs were indirect purchasers of Ticketmaster tickets pursuant to the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Illinois Brick and, therefore, lacked 
standing to sue.27 Additionally, “[t]he district court also held that, 
even if the plaintiffs were not [classified as] indirect purchasers, they 
were nevertheless inappropriate plaintiffs under the standards set 
forth” in the Supreme Court’s decision in AGC.28 Lastly, the trial 
court found that three of the consolidated cases lacked proper 
venue.29 This last holding is not relevant to the inquiry in this Com-
ment. The plaintiffs appealed to the Eighth Circuit, contending that 
the lower court erred in all of its holdings.30 
A.   Factual Background 
 According to the complaint, “Ticketmaster is a monopoly supplier 
of ticket distribution”31 and delivery services for a multitude of enter-
tainment events, and it has long-term exclusive contracts with most 
large-scale venues and “with almost every promoter of concerts in the 
United States.”32 Because of the pervasiveness of Ticketmaster’s con-
tracting practices with concert promoters, Ticketmaster is guaran-
teed to hold the ticket distribution rights to most large-scale popular 
music events, regardless of whether they have an exclusive contract 
                                                                                                                    
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000). 
 23. In re Ticketmaster, 929 F. Supp at 1276; Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 474. 
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 26. 
 25. Id. § 15. 
 26. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1168 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id.; see also Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 476 (noting the district court’s conclusion 
that plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing because plaintiffs “had not suffered an injury of 
the type that Congress sought to redress with the antitrust laws” and that “problems with 
calculating damages, duplicative recovery, and identifying proper members of plaintiffs’ 
proposed class” precluded standing under AGC).  
 29. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1168.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. Because the consolidated case was dismissed by the district court on the plead-
ings, the Eighth Circuit treated “all factual allegations of the complaint as true.”  Id. (cit-
ing Haberthur v. City of Raymore, 119 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 1997)).  
 32. Id. at 1169. 
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with the venue.33 This right gives Ticketmaster the ability “to dis-
tribute tickets over the telephone, at outlets such as [those at] retail 
[and department] stores, and at the venue” where the event will take 
place, as well as extracting from plaintiffs and other purchasers of 
tickets “supracompetitive fees” in the form of convenience and service 
charges, which can be as high as twenty dollars per ticket.34  The 
plaintiffs contended that, by paying those fees, they suffered injury 
to their property and have standing to sue under section 4 of the 
Clayton Act.35 
B.   Majority Opinion 
 The court began by announcing the Supreme Court precedent 
from Illinois Brick and its progeny that only “the ‘direct purchaser’ 
from a monopoly supplier could sue for treble damages under § 4 of 
the Clayton Act.”36 The majority also included a collection of scholarly 
interpretations defining the term “indirect purchaser.”37 However, 
the court then concocted its own indirect purchaser recipe by saying 
that “[a]n indirect purchaser is one who bears some portion of a mo-
nopoly overcharge only by virtue of an antecedent transaction be-
tween the monopolist and another, independent purchaser.”38 
 The Eighth Circuit proceeded to a necessary discussion of the eco-
nomic assumptions underlying the indirect purchaser rule.39 In hash-
ing out the rule, the court assumed that the direct purchaser is a 
firm that has little choice but to buy its inputs from a monopoly at a 
monopoly price and “[t]he indirect purchaser, in turn, pays some por-
                                                                                                                    
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. Consequently, since the Eighth Circuit opinion, and even more so since the ini-
tial filing of the Campos complaint in 1994, sales and distribution through Ticketmaster’s 
online service, www.Ticketmaster.com, have become the most prolific way for Ticketmaster 
to distribute tickets to concertgoers for events at large-scale venues. Anderson, supra note 
18. Ticketmaster has capitalized on this new convenient method of distributing tickets. 
Face value ticket prices can soar into the multi-hundreds of dollars for events such as 
Woodstock ‘99 and the Rolling Stones. The Consumers’ Association of Ireland is preparing 
a report on ticket prices which identifies an average convenience charge per ticket of 12.5% 
of the face value price for tickets sold through Ticketmaster’s distribution services, allow-
ing Ticketmaster to collect service charges equaling as much as thirty-five dollars per 
ticket. Ticket Prices Are ‘a rip off’, STAGE, Apr. 10, 2003, at 7.  
 35. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1169. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id.; see also Gregory J. Werden & Marius Schwartz, Illinois Brick and the Deter-
rence of Antitrust Violations—An Economic Analysis, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 629, 629 n.4 (1984) 
(“The term ‘indirect purchaser’ . . . means any party that purchases a product from any 
party in the vertical supply chain other than the party suspected of the antitrust violation 
. . . .”); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 1717, 1717 (1990) (defining indirect purchasers are “those who bought an illegally 
monopolized . . . product or service through the agency of a dealer, distributor, or some 
other independent reseller who was not a participant in the antitrust violation”). 
 38. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1169. 
 39. Id. at 1170. 
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tion of the monopoly overcharge only because the previous [direct] 
purchaser was unable to avoid that overcharge” and had to pass it on 
to the indirect purchaser.40 The court admitted that the monopoly 
overcharge usually “injures both those who deal directly and those 
who deal derivatively with the monopolist.”41 The majority identified 
this phenomenon as “incidence analysis,” or the “famously difficult” 
determination of “[p]recisely what part of the overcharge will be 
borne by the direct purchaser, and what [portion of the overcharge] 
will be borne by the indirect purchaser.”42 The court noted that the 
difficulty in apportioning damages between the direct and indirect 
purchaser may lead to duplicative recovery if both are granted stand-
ing to sue for treble damages, and it cited this reasoning as a justifi-
cation for denying standing to indirect purchasers under section 4 of 
the Clayton Act.43 Before reaching the merits of the case, the court 
opined that none of the exceptions to the indirect purchaser rule ex-
isted in this case.44 More specifically, there was no “cost-plus” con-
tract, no allegation of the indirect purchasers owning or controlling 
the direct purchaser, nor any “proper allegation that the direct pur-
chasers have conspired with . . . Ticketmaster to commit antitrust 
violation[s].”45  
 The majority responded to the plaintiffs’ assertion that because 
they paid fees directly to Ticketmaster they were direct purchasers of 
ticket distribution services with three specific rebuttals. First, the 
Eighth Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit by finding that Ticket-
master’s service was more akin to a billing practice and, therefore, 
not determinative of indirect purchaser status.46 Secondly, “[t]he 
plaintiffs’ inability to obtain ticket [distribution] in a competitive 
market is simply the consequence of the antecedent inability of ven-
ues to do so” by virtue of “Ticketmaster’s exclusive contracts with 
almost every promoter of concerts in the United States.”47 The major-
ity concluded that this kind of “derivative dealing is the essence of 
indirect purchaser status,” and in turn, constituted a bar to plaintiffs’ 
suit for damages under the antitrust laws.48 
 Third, in response to the plaintiffs’ assertion that Ticketmaster’s 
monopoly power is benign with respect to the venues because the 
service fees are collected directly from buyers and are not part of the 
“full” ticket price, the court adopted the notion that the actual “face 
                                                                                                                    
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1171.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. (citing McCarthy v. Recordex Service, Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 853 n.18 (1996)). 
 47. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1171. 
 48. Id. 
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value” of the ticket and the cost of service fees “amount[ed] to the 
single cost of attending the concert, regardless of how that cost is di-
vided.”49 The majority finally concluded that because this aggregate 
price of the ticket is “obviously a price [the concert-going] market will 
bear, a venue free from Ticketmaster’s domination of ticket distribu-
tion would be able to charge that price itself” while having the ability 
to keep the supracompetitive fees.50 The court affirmed the district 
court’s holding that the plaintiffs were, in fact, indirect purchasers of 
Ticketmaster’s services and therefore denied standing to sue for 
treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.51 
 However, the majority held that, under Illinois Brick, section 16 of 
the Clayton Act did not preclude the plaintiffs from seeking injunc-
tive relief.52 Because the complexities of incidence analysis do not 
arise when the courts consider the merits of injunctive relief, and be-
cause the plaintiffs claimed to have purchased tickets from and paid 
the monopoly overcharge to Ticketmaster, the court held that the 
plaintiffs did have standing to sue for injunctive relief.53  
C.   Dissenting Opinion 
 Judge Arnold disagreed with the majority’s classification of the 
plaintiffs in this case as indirect purchasers.54 He noted that the term 
“antecedent transaction” appears nowhere in the cited authority nor 
does the mere existence of an “antecedent transaction” convert all 
purchasers of a monopolized good or service into indirect purchasers 
under Illinois Brick.55 Judge Arnold embraced a two-prong analysis 
for determining whether a party is an indirect purchaser under Illi-
nois Brick.56 
 Illinois Brick requires that the antecedent transaction, first, 
“must have been one in a direct vertical chain of transactions” and, 
second, “must have resulted in the ‘passing on’ of [a portion of the] 
monopoly [overcharge] from the direct purchaser to the indirect pur-
chaser.”57 Judge Arnold concluded that no direct vertical chain of 
transactions existed because “[t]he monopoly product at issue in this 
                                                                                                                    
 49. Id. at 1171-72 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 
451, 495 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 50. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1172 (citing Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, 497 U.S. 199, 209 
(1990); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 492 (1968); United 
States Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1357-58 n.19 (2d Cir. 
1988)).  
 51. See id. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1174-75 (Arnold, J., dissenting).  
 55. Id. at 1174.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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case [was] ticket distribution services, not tickets.”58 The antecedent 
agreement between the venues and Ticketmaster was not one in 
which the venues bought something from Ticketmaster for the pur-
pose of reselling it to willing concertgoers.59 Rather, Ticketmaster 
sold its services directly to the plaintiffs and it is irrelevant that 
Ticketmaster “would not be supplying the service but for its antece-
dent agreement with the venues.”60   
 Judge Arnold concluded that the majority result unfortunately 
made it unlikely for this or any plaintiff to have the ability to ever 
bring a suit against Ticketmaster in the Eighth Circuit under section 
4 of the Clayton Act.61 
III.   LEGAL BASIS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT DECISION 
 In section 4 of the Clayton Act, Congress has provided the ability 
to sue for the remedy of treble damages to any person “injured in his 
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust 
laws” and the ability to “recover threefold the damages” sustained by 
him.62 The Court in Illinois Brick identified a dual purpose for Con-
gress providing this right of action: (1) “deterring [antitrust] violators 
and depriving them of the ‘fruits of their illegality,’” and (2) compen-
sating “victims of antitrust violations for their injuries.”63  
 Despite this apparently inclusive Congressional grant of access to 
the courts for victims of antitrust injury, the Court has not heeded its 
own caution against creating restrictive burdens on this access.64 In-
stead, the Court has constructed the indirect purchaser doctrine to 
bar certain plaintiffs standing to sue on antitrust claims. To best un-
derstand the concept of offensive passing-on and the restrictive indi-
rect purchaser rule in Illinois Brick, we must begin with the idea of 
defensive passing-on in its predecessor, Hanover Shoe.  
A.   The Passing-on Defense in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corp. 
 Hanover Shoe, a manufacturer of shoes, brought an action under 
section 4 of the Clayton Act alleging that United Shoe Machinery 
Corp.’s (“United”) “practice of leasing and refusing to sell its more 
complicated and important shoe machinery” forced Hanover to lease 
this machinery at an inflated price, which constituted unlawful mo-
                                                                                                                    
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1175. 
 62. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).  
 63. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).  
 64. Id. at 755-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 
352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957)). 
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nopolization in violation of the antitrust laws.65 Hanover prayed for 
the recovery of “the difference between what it paid United in shoe 
machine rentals and what it would have paid” had United, instead, 
sold those same machines at a noninflated price.66  
 United argued, in its defense, that (1) Hanover would have 
charged less and made the same level of profit had it bought, instead 
of leased, the machinery from United, and (2) Hanover “suffered no 
legally cognizable injury [because] the illegal overcharge . . . was re-
flected in the price charged for shoes sold by Hanover to its custom-
ers.”67 In other words, United argued that because the whole of this 
illegal overcharge was reflected in the price Hanover charged cus-
tomers for its shoes, they “passed-on” not only that charge, but also 
the injury caused by that charge to those customers. If the Court ac-
cepted this argument, it would essentially relieve United of any li-
ability to Hanover because Hanover’s customers, not Hanover itself, 
would have been the appropriate plaintiffs. 
 Yet, the Supreme Court rejected United’s assertion of a passing-
on defense, holding that “when a buyer shows that the price paid by 
him . . . is illegally high and also shows the amount of the over-
charge, he has made out a prima facie case of injury and damage 
within the meaning of [section 4 of the Clayton Act].”68 The Court 
opined that the injury to Hanover occurred at the moment when it 
leased the machinery at an illegally high price and that Hanover was 
“equally entitled to damages if [it] raised the price for [its] own prod-
uct.”69  
 The Court laid out three reasons for its decision to reject a pass-
ing-on defense. First, the Court identified the nearly insuperable dif-
ficulty of showing that Hanover could have the ability to, or even 
would, raise its prices absent the overcharge.70 Second, if this defense 
were available, it is doubtful that defendants would hesitate to prof-
fer it, which would create “additional long and complicated proceed-
ings involving massive evidence and complicated theories.”71 Lastly, 
the Supreme Court was concerned that the passing-on defense would 
reduce the effectiveness of treble damage actions due to the need to 
prove that the overcharge was passed onto individual customers. In 
this case, individual customers consisted of buyers of individual pairs 
of shoes with little interest or incentive to involve themselves in the 
suit.72 
                                                                                                                    
 65. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 483 (1968). 
 66. Id. at 484. 
 67. Id. at 487-88. 
 68. Id. at 489. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 493. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 494. 
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 While this decision solves the question of whether a passing-on 
defense may be used, the Court left unanswered the difficult question 
of whether the concept of “passing-on” can be used offensively by in-
direct purchasers to prove injury and damages under the antitrust 
laws. The Court met this question head-on in Illinois Brick.73  
B.   Offensive Passing-on and the Indirect Purchaser Rule in 
 Illinois Brick 
 When the Supreme Court decided Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois74 in 
1977, it confronted the “mirror image”75 of Hanover Shoe. The re-
spondent, the State of Illinois, initially brought this suit on behalf of 
state and local government agencies against the petitioner, Illinois 
Brick, under section 4 of the Clayton Act.76 Illinois argued that the 
petitioner had conspired to fix the prices of concrete blocks, contrary 
to the antitrust laws.77 These state and local government entities did 
not directly purchase the concrete blocks from the petitioner.78 In-
stead, the concrete block was primarily sold to masonry subcontrac-
tors who then submitted bids to general contractors, who, in turn, 
vied for government works contracts from the respondents.79 Al-
though the state and local governments were indirect purchasers of 
the monopolized concrete block, they contended that the whole or 
part of the monopoly overcharge taken on by the subcontractor pur-
chasing the concrete block from the petitioner was passed on to them 
via the general contractor.80 By virtue of absorbing all or part of this 
overcharge, the state and local government entities claimed that they 
sustained antitrust injury, giving them standing to sue under section 
4 of the Clayton Act.81 Illinois Brick rebutted that the respondents 
lacked standing to sue under Hanover Shoe because they were indi-
rect purchasers.82  
 Regarding the concern of applying the concept of “passing-on” 
equally to both plaintiffs and defendants, the Court had a choice: 
overrule Hanover Shoe to allow offensive and defensive passing-on or 
apply Hanover Shoe to bar attempts to use the passing-on theory of-
fensively.83 The Court took the latter approach, choosing to uphold 
the construction of section 4 that it announced in Hanover Shoe—the 
                                                                                                                    
 73. 431 U.S. at 726.   
 74. Id. at 722.  
 75. Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 603. 
 76. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 726. 
 77. Id. at 726-27. 
 78. Id. at 726.  
 79. Id.  
 80. See id. at 727. 
 81. Id. at 726-27. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 729.  
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“overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manu-
facture or distribution, is the party ‘injured in his business or prop-
erty.’“84 
 The Supreme Court cited a twofold rationale for choosing to con-
gruently bar defensive and offensive passing-on theories. First, the 
majority concluded that allowing the offensive but not the defensive 
use of the passing-on theory would create the risk of inconsistent ad-
judications and duplicative liability for defendants.85 The Court 
opined that in addition to the direct purchaser automatically recover-
ing the full amount of the overcharge, the indirect purchaser(s) 
would also sue to recover the amount of the overcharge they ab-
sorbed.86 If the majority were to accept this one-sided application of 
Hanover Shoe, it would be validating the presumption that the direct 
purchaser is entitled to a full recovery, “while preventing the defen-
dant from using that [same] presumption against the other plain-
tiff[s]” to bar their recovery.87 
 The second rationale for announcing this indirect purchaser doc-
trine barring the use of offensive passing-on theory was the same ra-
tionale central to the Court’s holding in Hanover Shoe.88 The Court 
denied the passing-on defense in Hanover Shoe because of the diffi-
culty in clearing the evidentiary hurdle in proving that the whole of 
the monopoly overcharge was passed-on to a subsequent purchaser.89 
The majority in Illinois Brick reasoned that this hurdle would be 
substantially exacerbated by the need for each subsequent pur-
chaser-plaintiff in the chain of distribution to demonstrate that he or 
she bore the whole or a portion of the overcharge to prove injury.90 
 Although the Court recognized the statutory purpose of section 
4—to compensate injured plaintiffs—in upholding Hanover Shoe, the 
Court validated the designation of the direct purchaser as the appro-
priate plaintiff to have standing to sue for antitrust injuries by virtue 
of a monopoly overcharge.91  
                                                                                                                    
 84. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)). 
 85. Id. at 730. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 730-31. 
 88. Compare Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 
(1968), with Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 732 (stating in both instances a concern for prevent-
ing long and complicated evidentiary proceedings giving parties the heavy burden of dem-
onstrating the passing-on and extent of the overcharge through the chain of distribution to 
prove injury to subsequent, indirect purchasers). 
 89. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493. 
 90. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 732. 
 91. Id. at 734-35. 
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IV.   INCONSISTENCY AND THE EVISCERATION OF THE ILLINOIS BRICK 
INDIRECT PURCHASER RULE 
 Despite the apparent clarity in the Court’s annunciation of the in-
direct purchaser rule, subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court 
and lower courts seem to have clouded this clear view of antitrust in-
jury and standing. The Supreme Court not only went on to create a 
comprehensive methodology for antitrust standing,92 but the Court 
approved, under state antitrust laws, the same indirect purchaser 
actions that it had per se barred in the federal context.93 Lower 
courts have interpreted the Illinois Brick indirect purchaser doctrine 
inconsistently since that decision.  
A.   The Supreme Court Clouding the View 
1.   Antitrust Standing in Associated General Contractors of 
California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters 
 In AGC, the Court created a two-part test to determine whether a 
plaintiff shall have standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 
First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has suffered an 
injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent, and 
for which they provide a remedy.94 Second, the Court proffered three 
factors for courts to consider. These include the remoteness of the in-
jury,95 the availability of a plaintiff with greater self-interest to bring 
an action against the monopoly firm,96 and the difficulty of the litiga-
tion in determining damages if an alternate plaintiff shall be permit-
ted to bring an action.97 
 Although this analysis is described as being “analytically dis-
tinct”98 from that of Illinois Brick, many of the same concerns that 
exist in Illinois Brick are embodied in AGC. Both are concerned with 
not burdening courts with the complicated task of apportioning dam-
ages.99 Some scholars have wondered, in light of the closeness of the 
two opinions, whether Illinois Brick would have been decided in the 
same manner if the Court had the luxury of having its antitrust 
                                                                                                                    
 92. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 
519, 540-43 (1983). 
 93. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989). 
 94. AGC, 459 U.S. at 540; see also Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 482 
(1982) (“The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of 
anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.”).  
 95. AGC, 459 U.S. at 540.  
 96. Id. at 542. 
 97. Id. at 543-44. 
 98. McCready, 457 U.S. at 476.  
 99. See AGC, 459 U.S. at 544; Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977).  
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standing guidelines from AGC as the backdrop.100 If this reversal of 
chronology actually took place, the Court may have decided Illinois 
Brick under the antitrust standing rubric set out in AGC, dispensing 
with the action based on the “remoteness of indirect purchasers, the 
complexity of the damage calculation, and the presence of potential 
plaintiffs . . . who would be motivated to bring an action.”101 Yet, the 
reality is that the Court failed to subsume Illinois Brick into the an-
titrust standing analysis, which leaves questions concerning how to 
correctly interpret Illinois Brick in light of AGC. 
 One possible interpretation is that if a plaintiff is identified as an 
indirect purchaser, courts can disregard the case-by-case analysis set 
out in AGC because, by their nature, indirect purchasers will rarely 
meet this standing test. This interpretation characterizes the way 
the indirect purchaser doctrine is presently applied.102 However, a 
second, albeit less stringent, interpretation may be that not every in-
direct purchaser would automatically be barred from bringing an ac-
tion for violation of the antitrust laws.103 A discussion later in this 
Comment will address the dichotomy between these two interpreta-
tions and the preference for the second interpretation when courts 
are charged with deciding cases such as Campos.104 
2.   California v. ARC America Corp. 
 In addition to creating a test for courts to determine whether to 
grant antitrust standing to plaintiffs, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in California v. ARC America Corp. (ARC)105 has had a destabilizing 
effect on antitrust deterrence and enforcement. ARC involved state 
government plaintiffs who were indirect purchasers of cement—in 
much the same way as the plaintiffs in Illinois Brick were indirect 
purchasers of brick—bringing a treble damages action not only under 
section 4 of the Clayton Act but also under similar state antitrust 
laws that granted recovery to direct and indirect purchasers alike.106 
This decision turned on whether the interpretation of section 4 of the 
Clayton Act found in Illinois Brick preempted state antitrust laws, 
                                                                                                                    
 100. See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in 
Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1999). 
 101. Id. Consequently, the indirect purchasers in Illinois Brick would most likely have 
met the antitrust injury component of the AGC test because the part of the monopoly over-
charge that was passed on to them is the type of injury that the antitrust laws were de-
signed to prevent.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 17-19. 
 104. See infra Part V. 
 105. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).  
 106. Id. at 97-98.  
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regardless of explicit state statutory provisions allowing indirect pur-
chasers to recover in a treble damages cause of action of this kind.107 
 The Court identified a path to follow in order to determine 
whether federal law preempts state law. Without an express state-
ment by Congress of preemption, courts can find that state law is 
preempted “when Congress intends that federal law occupy a given 
field,” or, if Congress has not occupied the field, when “the state law 
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”108 The Court, unconvinc-
ingly,109 concluded that allowing recovery for indirect purchasers un-
der state antitrust laws would not conflict with the policies expressed 
in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. The Court held that nowhere in 
any of the Court’s prior cases construing section 4 of the Clayton Act 
did a majority “identify a federal policy against States imposing li-
ability in addition to that imposed by federal law.”110  
 It is hard to imagine an overarching policy more clear than the 
policy announced in Illinois Brick: allowing offensive passing-on 
without the availability of defensive passing-on would lead to incon-
sistent adjudications, duplicity in recoveries, and unnecessary multi-
plicity in defendants’ liability.111 The Court persists in constructing 
an unnecessarily high wall which completely separates federal and 
state antitrust actions, each having no contingent effect on the other. 
Yet, in viewing state and federal antitrust actions from the stand-
point of potential defendants, it is simple to realize that allowing in-
direct purchasers to recover damages under state antitrust laws di-
rectly conflicts with the federal policy of preventing multiple liability 
underlying the indirect purchaser doctrine. Potential defendants do 
not construct this same barrier, and they perceive potential liability 
and the possibility of duplicative recoveries from state and federal 
damages actions in the aggregate. While unpersuasively explaining 
away the obvious contradiction between its ARC opinion and past 
federal indirect purchaser cases, the Court, in allowing state law-
sanctioned indirect purchaser actions, has effectively lessened, if not 
totally eliminated, a firm’s ability to “determine the expected cost of 
taking any action that falls in the gray areas of antitrust.”112 
                                                                                                                    
 107. Id. at 100. 
 108. Id. at 100-01 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).  
 109. See Blair & Harrison, supra note 100, at 12-13.  
 110. ARC, 490 U.S. at 105. 
 111. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730 (1977). 
 112. See Blair & Harrison, supra note 100, at 13. 
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B.   An Array of Inconsistent Lower Federal Court Interpretations of 
the Indirect Purchaser Rule 
 Adding to the contradictions surrounding the use of the indirect 
purchaser doctrine in Supreme Court decisions, the lower federal 
courts have levied inconsistent interpretations of Illinois Brick and of 
how the antitrust standing guidelines should be applied in relation to 
Illinois Brick. The following opinions demonstrate the confusion over 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in this area and reveal the need for an 
announcement from the High Court of a method to consistently de-
cide cases in this area. 
1.   In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litigation 
 In the case of In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litiga-
tion,113 the Third Circuit was confronted with a suit by manufactur-
ers of steel against railroad companies for halting the use of newly 
developed, less expensive means of transporting iron ore.114 Because 
the railroad controlled the off-loading technology, the railroad was al-
legedly able to boycott nonrailroad-owned docks by not making its 
transportation technology compatible with the newer, and less ex-
pensive, off-loading equipment.115 In addition, the railroad continued 
to charge the steel producers the more expensive rate for use of the 
older off-loading equipment.116 Although the manufacturers of the 
newer, less expensive off-loading equipment were the entities most 
directly affected by the railroad’s action, the plaintiff steel producers 
complained of damages stemming from the supracompetitive price 
they paid to the railroad, less the price that would have been paid by 
the steel manufacturers had the railroad allowed the newly devel-
oped technology to be used in off-loading iron ore.117 
 The Third Circuit, under AGC, granted standing to the plaintiff 
steel purchasers in this action.118 While recognizing that, “in some 
sense, [the steel producers were] ‘indirect’ purchasers,” the Third 
Circuit refused to simply bar recovery based on this point alone and 
noted that AGC instructed them to inquire into the remoteness of the 
injury and the “nature of the relationship between the parties.”119 
While the railroad’s anticompetitive actions caused injury to the 
component industries, the court concentrated on the brunt of the di-
rect injury borne by the steel producers: the increased costs stem-
ming from the railroad inhibiting the development of cheaper tech-
                                                                                                                    
 113. 998 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993).  
 114. Id. at 1152-53. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 1153. 
 117. Id. at 1154. 
 118. Id. at 1169. 
 119. Id. at 1168. 
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nology.120  The steel companies were the only customers of the iron 
ore shipping industry, and the court recognized that, “indeed, th[at] 
industry existed [exclusively] for them.”121 
 More importantly, the Third Circuit analyzed, under the guide-
lines in AGC, the possibility of duplicative recovery and the difficult 
issues involving apportionment of damages.122 The type of duplicative 
recovery that Illinois Brick wished to prevent—parties all along the 
chain of distribution competing for the same limited amount of prof-
its earned by the price-fixer from antitrust violations—was not pre-
sent here.123 This is because the steel producers’ damages claim is 
characteristic of a typical monopoly overcharge, and the component 
industries are claiming lost profits.124 The court made the distinct 
point that the existence of complexities in apportioning damages 
should not allow the court to avoid the litigation.125 This makes good 
sense because standing is an initial determination in which the court 
inquires into whether the plaintiffs “have alleged a cause of action 
and have requested the recovery of damages that are cognizable un-
der the law.”126 The Third Circuit brings some rationality to this dis-
cussion by noting that injured parties should not be further penal-
ized and left without any redress simply because the trial court as-
sumes that, in every instance of an action brought by an indirect 
purchaser, the ascertainment of damages will be a burden too great 
for the court to carry.127   
2.   In re Brand Name Prescription Drug Antitrust Litigation 
 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Brand Name Prescription 
Drug Antitrust Litigation (Brand Name),128 written by Chief Judge 
Posner, also left the window open for private treble damages actions 
by indirect purchasers.129 In this case, retail pharmacies brought an 
action against wholesalers and manufacturers of prescription drugs, 
claiming that the defendants conspired with each other to effectively 
boycott certain retailers by denying them discounts on brand-name 
prescription drugs that were given to other preferred customers, in-
cluding HMOs and mail order pharmacies.130 Although the court held 
that the plaintiffs were quintessential indirect purchasers that were 
                                                                                                                    
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1169. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1169-70.  
 126. Id. at 1169. 
 127. Id. 
 128. 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1997).  
 129. See id. at 604-07. 
 130. Id. at 602-04.  
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barred from recovery of monopoly overcharges in an antitrust action, 
the court also determined that there was enough evidence of the exis-
tence of an alleged conspiracy for the plaintiffs to survive the defen-
dant’s motion for summary judgment.131  
 However, in the event the defendant wholesalers and manufac-
turers did not take part in a price-fixing conspiracy, Chief Judge 
Posner reasoned: 
We can imagine the present case reconfigured in a way that might 
take it out of the orbit of [Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick]; it 
would not be a matter of carving a further exception. A number of 
pharmacies have tried to improve their bargaining position vis-à-
vis the drug manufacturers by forming buying groups. . . . The 
manufacturers have been steadfast in refusing to grant discounts 
to such groups. If this refusal, taking as it does the form of a re-
fusal to enter into direct contractual relations with certain retail-
ers, such as the manufacturers have with their favored customers, 
were successfully challenged as a boycott, the Illinois Brick rule, 
which is a rule concerning overcharges, would fall away. The 
plaintiffs would be permitted to prove up whatever damages they 
could show had flowed from the boycott, provided they weren’t 
seeking to recover overcharges, for that would entail the very inci-
dence analysis that Illinois Brick bars.132 
 This scenario suggests the problem with Illinois Brick. If the 
plaintiffs are not deemed by a court to be indirect purchasers, then 
this alleviates the need to rely on a boycott theory. Yet, reliance by 
plaintiffs on a boycott theory would become a requirement if they 
were determined to be indirect purchasers.133 Reliance on a boycott 
theory would necessitate a demonstration not of an overcharge but, 
rather, the lost profits that resulted from the existence of the boy-
cott.134 However, in determining the lost profits, the court would be 
charged with the task of identifying exactly what the discount, in 
this scenario, would have been had the plaintiffs not been disfavored 
by the manufacturers and wholesalers.135 This calculation is the same 
as the basic overcharge analysis—identifying the price the indirect 
purchaser would have been charged had the supracompetitive over-
charge not existed and not been passed on to them—which the Court 
supposedly prohibited in Illinois Brick.136  
                                                                                                                    
 131. Id. at 606, 616.  
 132. Id. at 606 (internal citations omitted).  
 133. Blair & Harrison, supra note 100, at 20. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id.; see also Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732 (1977). 
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3.   Lucas Automotive Engineering, Inc. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 
Inc. 
 Unlike Chief Judge Posner’s concentration on the substantive vio-
lation in Brand Name, Lucas Automotive Engineering, Inc. v. Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc. (Lucas)137 represents an expansion of the per se 
application of Illinois Brick without respect to the substantive viola-
tion claimed by the plaintiff.138 Here the plaintiff, a distributor of vin-
tage automobile tires, filed an action to recover treble damages 
against its competitor for acquiring an exclusive right to manufac-
ture and distribute Firestone vintage tires.139 The court initially de-
termined that, as a competitor, the plaintiff lacked the requisite anti-
trust injury and therefore lacked standing to sue for treble damages 
under section 4 of the Clayton Act.140  
 Alternatively, the plaintiffs alleged that they had standing since 
they were forced to purchase some of their stock of vintage tires from 
the defendant competing distributor as a result of this exclusive con-
tract.141 Noting that the plaintiffs had yet to actually purchase any 
tires from the defendants and were purchasing products directly 
from the primary supplier, who in turn used the defendant as a dis-
tributor, the court held that the plaintiffs were indirect purchasers.142 
While the Supreme Court of the United States had yet to apply the 
indirect purchaser rule to a claim of this type,143 the Ninth Circuit 
expanded the indirect purchaser doctrine from applying only to price-
fixing cases to applying it to most actions under section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act.144   
4.   Sports Racing Services, Inc. v. Sports Car Club of America, 
Inc. 
 The defendants in Sports Racing Services, Inc. v. Sports Car Club 
of America, Inc. (Sports Racing)145 were the organizers of amateur 
sports car racing events in which the plaintiff participated.146 As or-
ganizer of these events, the defendants required all participants to 
                                                                                                                    
 137. 140 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1998).  
 138. Id. at 1233-34. 
 139. Id. at 1230-32. 
 140. Id. at 1233. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1233-34. 
 143. The case law applying the indirect purchaser rule under section 4 of the Clayton 
Act had been limited to cases involving sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act while this 
opinion suggested the expansion of the doctrine to include those cases involving section 7 of 
the Clayton Act. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. 131 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1997).  
 146. Id. at 878. This Comment solely looks at how the court viewed plaintiff John 
Freeman; it does not discuss the Court’s viewpoint of Freeman’s business, plaintiff Sports 
Racing Services, Inc. (SRS). 
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purchase and use specific parts that, conveniently, the defendants 
exclusively sold via an independent distributor.147 Plaintiff, therefore, 
did not purchase these automobile parts directly from the defen-
dants. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants monopolized the par-
ticular market for sports racing cars and parts, and that the defen-
dants illegally tied the plaintiff’s ability to race in these events to the 
purchase of specified race cars and parts.148  
 The Tenth Circuit’s analysis is strikingly similar to Judge Pos-
ner’s opinion in Brand Name. The majority noted that “standing 
analysis must take into account the type of antitrust claim being as-
serted”149 in holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his 
monopolization claim because he was an indirect purchaser of sports 
racing cars and parts.150 However, at the same time, the majority 
concluded that the plaintiff was not barred from asserting his tying 
claim because the plaintiff was a “direct purchaser of the tying prod-
uct and he was forced to purchase the tied product” from the dis-
tributor dictated by the defendants.151 The court identified the tying 
product as “racing services” and the tied product as the cars and 
parts that the defendants specified for entrance into the races.152 
 The oddity of this holding is that the market at issue in the mo-
nopolization claim—the purchase of specified sports racing cars and 
parts—is precisely the same as the tied product market in the tying 
claim. Yet, the court barred the plaintiff from going forward with the 
former claim and allowed standing for the latter, although both 
claims were aimed at redressing the defendants’ anticompetitive ac-
tions in the market for cars and parts. This method of analysis is 
much like that of Judge Posner’s in Brand Name, in that the court 
relied exclusively on the label of the claim in determining its treat-
ment, even though the defendants’ actual actions were not differ-
ent.153  
 Although the court characterized the plaintiff as an indirect pur-
chaser under the monopolization claim, the court recognized the 
“first ‘innocent’ purchaser” notion that stems from Illinois Brick and 
applied it to the tying claim.154 In Sports Racing, the direct purchaser 
of the tied item was merely a pawn for the defendants, and the de-
                                                                                                                    
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 878-79. 
 149. Id. at 882.  
 150. Id. at 882-84.  
 151. Id. at 886-87. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Chief Judge Posner concentrated on the idea that changing the label of the viola-
tion could allow an indirect purchaser to gain standing as long as this plaintiff did not base 
their damages claim on a theory of monopoly overcharge. See In re Brand Name Prescrip-
tion Drug Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 1997). However, the two opinions di-
verge because the Sports Racing court did not discuss damage calculations. 
 154. Sports Racing, 131 F.3d at 889. 
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fendants should not be able to avoid enforcement by designating an 
independent distributor to sell the tied product to the plaintiff.155 
Therefore, the court took the common-sense approach by granting 
standing to the indirect purchaser and appointing it as the “best” 
party to pursue this claim.156  
V.   LOOKING AT CAMPOS THROUGH A NEW LENS 
A.   Are Purchasers of Concert Tickets Through Ticketmaster’s Ticket 
Distribution Service Really Indirect Purchasers? 
 In addition to Judge Arnold’s dissent in Campos,157 scholars have 
devoted a fair amount of academic discussion to the notion that the 
plaintiffs in Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp. were not in fact indirect 
purchasers.158 The Eighth Circuit in Campos proposed that “[a]n in-
direct purchaser is one who bears some portion of a monopoly over-
charge only by virtue of an antecedent transaction between the mo-
nopolist and another, independent purchaser.”159 The exclusive con-
tracts between the venues and Ticketmaster were the antecedent 
transactions that rendered the plaintiffs in Campos indirect pur-
chasers because the exclusive contracts identified from whom the 
plaintiffs would purchase tickets.160 The majority reasoned that the 
ticket price and the service charge were two segments that combined 
to equal the overall price of admission to a concert.161 The court as-
sumed that this price was at a profit-maximizing level which the 
market could bear and that if Ticketmaster, or a similar distributor, 
was not involved in this arrangement, the venue would charge con-
certgoers the same price.162 This allowed the Campos majority to view 
the venues as incurring the service charge themselves by permitting 
Ticketmaster to distribute tickets to events at these venues.  
 The Eighth Circuit’s misapplication of Illinois Brick stems from 
the court’s inability to properly identify the monopoly product; in this 
case, ticket distribution services. An example taken from your every-
day barber shop best illustrates this misapplication.163 
                                                                                                                    
 155. Id. at 887.  
 156. Id. This argument by the court is more akin to the examination of the merits of 
potential plaintiffs that is found in AGC. 
 157. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1174-75 (8th Cir. 1998) (Arnold, J., 
dissenting).  
 158. See Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the 
Barriers for Antitrust Injury and Standing, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437, 447 (2001); Blair & 
Harrison, supra note 100, at 21-23. 
 159. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1169. 
 160. Id. at 1171. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1172. 
 163. The following example is adapted from Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 488-89.  
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 When a person wants a “crew cut,”164 she can either go to the local 
barber shop and employ the services of the barber to cut her hair 
with clippers, or she can purchase a set of clippers directly from the 
manufacturer and perform the haircut herself. If the woman chooses 
to have her hair cut at the barber shop, she would be the direct pur-
chaser of the barber’s hair-cutting services and the indirect pur-
chaser of the clippers that the barber uses to give the haircut. On the 
other hand, if the woman chooses to cut her own hair, she would be a 
direct purchaser of the clippers and would not even enter the market 
for the barber’s hair-cutting services.165 
 Suppose the clipper manufacturer is the monopolist and the clip-
pers are the monopoly product. If the woman chooses to have her 
hair cut by the barber, she will be an indirect purchaser of the mo-
nopoly product and will, in turn, bear the portion of the monopoly 
overcharge which the barber passes on to her. Thus, because of diffi-
culties in apportioning damages and the avoidance of multiple liabil-
ity, a court would anoint the barber the direct purchaser of the mo-
nopoly product. Moreover, the barber would be the appropriate plain-
tiff to bring suit against the monopoly manufacturer under Illinois 
Brick.166 However, if the woman decides to purchase the monopoly 
product and cut her hair herself, then she obviously is the direct pur-
chaser of the clippers and, furthermore, would be granted standing to 
sue the monopolist manufacturer under section 4 of the Clayton 
Act.167 
 Change the scenario. If the monopolist is the barber who is the 
only barber in town and the monopoly product is the hair-cutting 
services, then it is difficult to see how the woman could ever be an 
indirect purchaser of the monopoly product. If the woman employs 
the services of the barber to cut her hair, then she is a direct pur-
chaser of the barber’s hair-cutting services and she “would clearly be 
a direct purchaser of the monopoly product.”168 The woman can avoid 
paying the monopoly overcharge “by never entering the market for 
the monopoly product”169—purchasing the clippers and cutting her 
own hair. Under this revised scenario, any antecedent agreement 
that may exist between the manufacturer of the clippers and the 
barber would not affect the woman’s purchaser status. 
                                                                                                                    
 164. A crew cut is “a style of man’s or boy’s haircut in which the hair is cropped close to 
the head, but left bristly on top to look like a brush.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY 342 (4th ed. 2000). A woman is used in this scenario as an homage to a woman 
who would love a “crew cut” but, according to WEBSTER’S definition, can never have one. 
 165. Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 488-89.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
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 This example magnifies the importance of courts correctly identi-
fying the monopolist and the monopoly product. With this example in 
mind, the court may have interpreted the plaintiffs in Campos more 
accurately as direct purchasers if it would have simply construed the 
monopoly product as ticket distribution services and, therefore, Tick-
etmaster as the monopolist.170 
 The example171 also illustrates the need for there to be a distinc-
tion between goods and services. In the barber shop example, the 
clippers are a good which buyers can purchase and resell, making the 
indirect purchaser doctrine an issue because of the concerns of diffi-
culty in apportioning damages and duplicative liability arising out of 
the possibility of subsequent purchasers. However, the barber’s hair-
cutting services do not implicate the indirect purchaser doctrine be-
cause once the service is rendered, the hair is gone and it is swept 
away. The value of the service cannot be resold and can only be real-
ized by the direct purchaser.172 Therefore, when the monopoly prod-
uct is a service, it is irrelevant whether the service provider uses 
other goods, such as clippers or, in the case of Campos, tickets in the 
rendering of that service. 
B.   Limiting Illinois Brick’s Indirect Purchaser Doctrine in Favor of a 
Comprehensive Case-by-Case Analysis 
 The inquiry must not end here. Even assuming the Eighth Circuit 
was correct in its interpretation of preceding case law—that the 
plaintiffs in Campos were, in fact, indirect purchasers173—this deci-
sion raises many concerns about the availability of points of entry 
into the judicial process for similarly situated plaintiffs and the wis-
dom of such a rigid rule. Despite the pronouncement of the Supreme 
Court that it is an “unwarranted and counterproductive exercise to 
litigate a series of exceptions” to the indirect purchaser rule, even 
though the “economic assumptions underlying the Illinois Brick rule 
                                                                                                                    
 170. The Eighth Circuit viewed Ticketmaster as the monopolist which sold its ticket 
distribution services to the direct purchaser venues which, in turn, sold tickets to the indi-
rect purchaser-plaintiffs. However, the plaintiffs alleged monopoly overcharges arising out 
of Ticketmaster’s services and not from the purchase of tickets. Campos v. Ticketmaster 
Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1174-75 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 171. The barber shop example provides a better metaphor for the indirect purchaser 
analysis than Kingsbury’s house-painting example. See Kingsbury, supra note 17, at 488-
89. Certainly, if a subsequent buyer of a painted house assumes a portion of the overcharge 
that the previous owner incurred as a result of the previous owner’s purchase of the mo-
nopoly product (painting services), then the subsequent purchaser may be considered an 
indirect purchaser of the painting services. Once one employs the services of a monopolist 
barber, the hair is gone and the value of this service cannot be passed on to a subsequent 
purchaser. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1171.  
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might be disproved in . . . specific case[s],”174 the Court has left much 
to be desired in indirect purchaser jurisprudence by not granting cer-
tiorari on any of the inconsistent lower court decisions in this area. 
This neglect, coupled with an announcement of general antitrust 
standing in AGC and the allowance of indirect purchaser actions on 
the state level, has rendered this line of jurisprudence in need of di-
rection. 
1.   The Need for Flexibility in Any New Analysis 
 A new doctrine must not be rigid and should be flexible enough to 
deal with most factual situations that confront it. A more prophylac-
tic rule, akin to AGC, which courts can apply on a case-by-case basis 
will allow courts to effectively weigh a number of factors in a prag-
matic manner. Thus, this rule will allow plaintiffs to knock down the 
per se barrier that has been placed in front of them in these antitrust 
cases and bestow upon parties who are injured by monopolists a clear 
point of entry into our judicial system.  
2.   Revised Factors for Antitrust Standing Under Section 4 of the 
Clayton Act 
 This Comment does not necessarily propose any new factors for 
courts to consider on the issue of antitrust standing. However, in or-
der for courts to apply the AGC criteria in a pragmatic fashion, 
courts must view these criteria through a more practical and flexible 
lens. AGC announced a two-pronged analysis for determining 
whether a plaintiff has standing to press an antitrust claim. First, 
the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has suffered an injury 
that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and redress.175 Sec-
ond, the Court proffered three factors for courts to consider in deter-
mining whether to permit the indirect purchaser-plaintiff to bring an 
action: the remoteness of the injury,176 the availability of a plaintiff 
with greater self-interest to bring an action against the monopoly 
firm,177 and the difficulty of determining damages and its effect on 
the overall difficulty of the litigation.178 
(a)   Antitrust Injury 
 Courts deem antitrust plaintiffs who fail the first prong of the 
AGC test to have not incurred the type of injury that the antitrust 
                                                                                                                    
 174. Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, 497 U.S. 199, 217 (1990). 
 175. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 
519 (1983); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text.   
 176. AGC, 459 U.S. at 540.  
 177. Id. at 542. 
 178. Id. at 543-44. 
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laws protect. Yet, even if plaintiffs have suffered a sufficient anti-
trust injury and have satisfactorily met the factors within the second 
prong of the AGC standing test, as indirect purchasers, courts bar 
them from pressing this claim in price-fixing suits.179 However, 
Brand Name has suggested that indirect purchasers who recharac-
terize their injury as stemming from some violation other than price-
fixing would satisfy the antitrust injury prong of this test.180  
 This reconfiguring of a complaint to fit the substantive violation 
into the appropriate pigeon hole is the height of form over substance. 
Whether the plaintiff alleges price-fixing violations or, for example, a 
group boycott, the injury and resulting damages are likely to be the 
same. Indirect purchasers seem likely to satisfy the antitrust injury 
prong of the AGC test because the monopoly overcharge, which even-
tually passes on to them, is the type of injury that the antitrust laws 
were designed to prevent. To insure the requisite flexibility and 
pragmatism in the application of AGC, Illinois Brick should not be 
viewed as foreclosing the possibility of moving onto the second prong 
of AGC. If the indirect purchaser-plaintiff can sufficiently plead an 
antitrust injury, the court should evaluate the merits of granting an 
antitrust plaintiff of this type standing under the second prong of 
AGC. 
(b)  Remoteness of the Injury and the Availability of a Plaintiff with 
Greater Self-Interest to Bring an Action Against the Monopoly 
Firm 
 In addition, AGC requires courts to consider the directness or in-
directness of the alleged injury and whether “an identifiable class of 
persons [exists] whose self-interest would normally motivate them” 
to pursue the claim against the monopolist in order to vindicate the 
public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws.181 Under the cur-
rent paradigm, however, it is insignificant that the indirect pur-
chaser-plaintiffs have suffered the most direct injury and have the 
greatest motivation, in light of the directness of that injury, to bring 
the claim forward because a per se application of Illinois Brick denies 
these plaintiffs the opportunity to do so.  
 Lower Lake Erie,182 with this concern at the core of its rationale, 
suggests that the plaintiff with the greatest motivation to bring the 
claim and with the most direct injury may have standing under sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act even if the court identifies this plaintiff as 
                                                                                                                    
 179. Blair & Harrison, supra note 100, at 17 n.147. 
 180. In re Brand Name Prescription Drug Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
 181. AGC, 459 U.S. at 540, 542.  
 182. In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1993).  
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an indirect purchaser.183 Moreover, taking into account the exception 
to the indirect purchaser rule regarding a direct purchaser owned or 
controlled by the firm fixing prices, which is sanctioned in Illinois 
Brick,184 the Supreme Court itself has suggested that indirect pur-
chasers “would have federal standing when the . . . direct purchaser 
has little motivation to bring an action” to vindicate the public inter-
est in antitrust enforcement.185 Sports Racing echoes this suggestion 
by rejecting an overly restrictive indirect purchaser doctrine.186 Such 
a doctrine would not only favor a direct purchaser who is not the best 
plaintiff to seek redress from the anticompetitive actions of the mo-
nopolist—regarding the direct purchaser’s motivation to bring suit—
but also would bar indirect purchasers at all costs, all at the expense 
of “vigorous private enforcement of the antitrust laws.”187 Under this 
pair of factors in the second prong of AGC, courts should give great 
weight in their standing determinations to a demonstration that the 
indirect purchaser-plaintiff is most directly injured by the antitrust 
violation and that there is no other party, including the direct pur-
chaser, who has a greater motivation to pursue this claim.  
(c)  The Difficulty of “Incidence Analysis” if Courts Permit an Indirect 
Purchaser-Plaintiff to Bring an Action 
 Lastly, courts must determine whether, if the indirect purchaser 
is granted standing to pursue its claim, judges and juries will be sad-
dled with the “famously difficult” task of determining what price the 
indirect purchaser would have been charged had the direct purchaser 
not incurred the whole or part of the monopoly overcharge.188 Chief 
Judge Posner in Brand Name applied the rigid dictates of Illinois 
Brick by assuming that any indirect purchaser pleading an injury 
from a monopoly overcharge will certainly charge the court with the 
complex task of apportioning damages that accompany this incidence 
analysis and which Illinois Brick expressly prohibited.189 Yet, Posner 
alerted the public to a detour around the indirect purchaser doctrine 
by not only suggesting that an antitrust plaintiff plead an alternate 
                                                                                                                    
 183. Id. at 1168-69. 
 184. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732 n.12 (1977). 
 185. Blair & Harrison, supra note 100, at 14. The ownership-and-control exception 
permits the indirect purchaser to pursue her claim because the direct purchaser is not in-
dependent from the monopolist and, therefore, has little, if any, interest to pursue the 
claim on behalf of the public interest in antitrust enforcement. Id. at 14 n.116. 
 186. Id.  
 187. Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 131 F.3d 874, 889 (10th 
Cir. 1997). 
 188. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Contractors, 459 U.S. 
519, 543-44 (1983); see also Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir. 
1998). 
 189. In re Brand Name Prescription Drug Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 606 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
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substantive violation but also suggesting that this plaintiff may pray 
for relief from injury that takes the form of lost profits instead of a 
monopoly overcharge.190 This suggestion to plaintiffs would require 
courts to take part in a similar, and sometimes difficult, damage cal-
culation. If the same analysis is involved in either calculation, why 
does the Seventh Circuit allow the court to take on this task to de-
termine lost profits while, in the same breath, shunning the similar 
task by denying standing to plaintiffs who ask the court to grant re-
lief from monopoly overcharges? 
 The Third Circuit’s holding in Lower Lake Erie is equally as curi-
ous in regards to this question. The court refused to prohibit stand-
ing to indirect purchasers merely because of assumed complexities in 
apportionment of damages.191 Reliability of damage theories should 
not be determined at this stage of the litigation simply because they 
are presented in a complex way.192 Rather, a court should only deny 
standing when the initial allegation of damages appears “incapable 
of accurate calculation.”193 According to Chief Judge Posner, calcula-
tion of lost profits and, in turn, the monopoly overcharge is not as 
“famously difficult” as the Illinois Brick Court once thought.   
3.   Aligning Federal Indirect Purchaser Jurisprudence with ARC 
 It would be unrealistic to open the federal courts to indirect pur-
chasers in the same manner that ARC approved state statutes that 
did so.194 However, liberalization of the indirect purchaser doctrine 
through the more pragmatic application of AGC described above195 
would go a long way toward bringing state and federal courts in step 
with each other. This alignment should facilitate a greater expecta-
tion on the part of defendants of the costs of their actions in the anti-
trust realm. 
C.   Applying a More Pragmatic AGC to Campos 
 Assuming that the plaintiff-concertgoers were indirect purchasers, 
the factual background of Campos does not lend itself to the per se 
application of Illinois Brick used by the Eighth Circuit. The plaintiffs 
in Campos complained of being subjected to a monopoly overcharge 
in the form of supracompetitive service fees.196 These overcharges 
satisfy the antitrust injury prong of the AGC test because they con-
                                                                                                                    
 190. Id.; Blair & Harrison, supra note 100, at 20. 
 191. In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 U.S. 1144, 1169 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id.  
 194. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105 (1989). 
 195. See supra Part V.B.2. 
 196. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1168 (8th Cir. 1998).  
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stitute the type of injury that the antirust laws were designed to pre-
vent. 
 The plaintiff class of concertgoers is the only party injured by 
Ticketmaster’s anticompetitive activity. The supracompetitive ser-
vice fees charged by Ticketmaster are directly borne, in full, by every 
consumer who orders tickets for popular entertainment events by 
waiting in line at a sanctioned Ticketmaster outlet in a local shop-
ping mall, by logging onto Ticketmaster’s online ordering system 
(which is often slow and frequently crashes), or by calling Ticketmas-
ter’s charge-by-phone system and having the privilege of getting past 
a busy signal.197 Even under the Eighth Circuit’s characterization of 
concert venues as direct purchasers, these venues bear no resem-
blance to an injured direct purchaser who passes on the whole or 
part of the monopoly overcharge down the chain of distribution.198 
Rather, concert venues fit the mold of an unharmed bystander—the 
venues, although labeled as direct purchasers by the Eighth Circuit, 
do not seem to have sustained any sort of cognizable injury. Quite 
the opposite result is present, and concert venues receive part of the 
monopoly overcharge in exchange for granting to Ticketmaster the 
exclusive right to distribute tickets for events which will take place 
at these venues.199 Under this more realistic setting, the plaintiff-
indirect purchasers have sustained the most direct injury, and these 
concertgoers can hardly depend on the concert venues to have the 
necessary motivation to vindicate Ticketmaster’s antitrust violations 
on their behalf. 
 Lastly, although the notion of incidence analysis may present dif-
ficulties for courts in apportioning damages, these complexities are 
lacking under the factual background in Campos. Ticketmaster 
passes on the whole of the monopoly overcharge to concertgoers. 
Moreover, the court in Campos misconstrued the record by character-
izing the monopoly overcharge and the price of the ticket as one fee 
that the venue would charge in the absence of any exclusive contract 
with Ticketmaster. The court was not required to determine what 
price the indirect purchaser-plaintiffs would have been charged in 
the absence of the supracompetitive convenience fee in order to accu-
rately apportion damages to the plaintiffs in this suit. When tickets 
are purchased directly from the box offices at popular entertainment 
                                                                                                                    
 197. Ticketmaster offers these three ways to obtain tickets to most any entertainment 
event. I speak, not sarcastically, from many personal frustrating experiences that accom-
pany attempts at being lucky enough to get tickets to see my favorite band. While it is cer-
tainly a joyous moment when I am successful in this endeavor, being charged exorbitant 
convenience fees for something that is hardly convenient makes this moment bittersweet.  
 198. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1174 (Arnold, J., dissenting). 
 199. Id. 
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venues, convenience charges are not levied on concertgoers.200 There-
fore, courts would not be confronted with the same complex appor-
tionment calculations that accompany factual situations consisting of 
a direct purchaser only passing on part of the monopoly overcharge 
to indirect purchasers. Viewed in this way, the plaintiffs in Campos 
fall short of those in Illinois Brick and other indirect purchaser cases 
of this type. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The outcome in Campos certainly seems less logical when viewed 
through the more pragmatic lens of AGC proposed in this Comment. 
AGC embodies the notion that not all indirect purchasers are created 
equal. A pragmatic application of its two-pronged analysis, coupled 
with a relaxation of the strictures of Illinois Brick, will make this no-
tion a reality. It will open the doors of the federal courthouse to 
plaintiffs who resemble, in their antitrust injuries, favored plaintiffs 
under the current paradigm, but who are denied standing, even after 
favorably meeting the criteria in AGC, solely based on an across-the-
board application of an arbitrary label. This logical shift in doctrine 
is absolutely necessary if the American legal system wishes to take 
seriously the task of facilitating vigorous private enforcement of the 
antitrust laws. 
 
                                                                                                                    
 200. Most venues do not charge any fees in excess of the face value ticket price for 
ticket purchases directly from the venue box office. While venues are not precluded from 
charging this excessive monopolistic fee, those that do, do not do so in such an excessive 
dollar amount as does Ticketmaster. 
